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【論文の内容の要旨】 
In this thesis, we study three real option problems for firm’s investment strategies 
under asymmetric information. We consider that when firm owner (principal) delegates 
investment decision to manager (agent), manager has private information that owner 
cannot observe. Importantly, we examine not only investment timing, but also 
investment quantity under the asymmetric information situation. 
  
We begin by examining optimal strategies for an irreversible investment. We show 
that investment timing is more delayed under asymmetric information than under full 
information, implying a decrease in equity value. However, in order to minimize this 
inefficiency, investment quantity is more increased under asymmetric information than 
under full information. Thus, there are trade-offs between efficiencies of investment 
timing and investment quantity under asymmetric information. 
 
We then incorporate the reversibility of investment and investigate that how changes 
in the degree of reversibility affect investment strategies. We obtain that under 
asymmetric information, higher degree of reversibility accelerates investment timing 
and increases investment quantity, implying an increase in equity value. More 
interestingly, with a higher degree of reversibility, the distortion of asymmetric 
information on investment strategies are increased, and then the loss that arises from 
information asymmetry is increased. 
 
As a further extension, we incorporate the possibility of technology improvement. We 
consider that after investment, there is a potential technology improvement which could 
help firm to save some operational expenditure. We examine the interactive effects 
between reversibility and technology improvement under asymmetric information. We 
find that with the possibility of technology improvement, higher degree of reversibility 
accelerates investment timing, but not necessarily increases investment quantity. 
Additionally, higher arrival probability of technology improvement accelerates 
investment timing, but decreases investment quantity. Finally, we find that the loss 
that results from information asymmetry is increasing with the arrival probability of 
technology improvement. 
